Counter Terrorism

CounterTerrorism

Limitationsof the public-private partnership

Oneof the key limitations of a public-private partnership is the sharingof information. The amount of info shared between these two partiesis not substantial enough to ensure infrastructure protection. Thisis because most of the information is classified and the institutionsare not ready to exchange particular aspects deeming them critical.Consequently, regarding info, blank spots exist on both the industryand government sides. The critical infrastructure operators can onlyachieve mitigation of such vulnerabilities. The operators wouldguarantee mitigation of these weaknesses since they have adequateknow-how and expertise on their structures. This knowledge isadequate to instigate the security measures. In that regard,government agents rely on the industry’s cooperation. If theindustry is unwilling to cooperate, then it becomes harder for thegovernment representatives to gather adequate information. Eventhough utilizing legal frameworks can alleviate the unwillingnessissue, it does so to a certain degree. Much of the info can only beavailed if the industry has the will to cooperate [ CITATION Har101 l 1033 ].

Theextent of security is a challenge posed to both industry andgovernment. In other words, establishing the level of security amongthe stakeholders of both industry and the government is a commonissue. In addition to that, the costs involved and the financialinvestment responsibility emerges in both sides. As a result,citizens end up paying more to cater for security. In that regard,lack of public involvement in such discussions limits cooperation.Since it affects the publics, they should be included in the debates.However, including all the private and public stakeholders will bringabout divergent interests that limit collaboration on direinfrastructure protection. It is, therefore, paramount for thestakeholders to assent to a certain level of uncertainty [ CITATION Har101 l 1033 ].

Lessonsfrom the Algerian conflict

Onelesson gained from the Algerian conflict is that soldiers are not themost effective tool to defeat terrorism. Both French public andauthorities discovered that it would take more than just the armedforces to fight terrorism. Nevertheless, they provide greatassistance due to the resources and power they have. On the otherhand, experts in the police force, who have been trained for thatparticular purpose, with suitable legal frameworks in hand are quitecrucial. In addition to that, expert judges having nationaljurisdiction working in partnership with these police force arenecessary. The above elements have to be well-organized and closelymonitored to ensure they are effective. France also learned thatutilization of immoral or illegal techniques draws collective censureof the nation that utilizes them. However, France would face numerousattacks before the establishment of the current system to a scourgeof terrorism [ CITATION Har101 l 1033 ].

Ingeneral, France discovered they needed a specialized police force todeal with the specific threats emanating from terrorism. They learnedthat a specialized group would be more beneficial to address theterrorist than the armed forces. However, the military was stillneeded due to their resources and power. Additionally, they learnedthat specialized judges with national authority were necessary. Thejudges would then work in close collaboration with the specializedpolice units to ensure security is achieved. It was also imperativefor all these groups to work harmoniously to improve the securitystatus. Apart from that, using illegal methods that were immoral innature would also draw condemnation. Nevertheless, it took severalextra attacks for the above lessons to be adopted into the new system[ CITATION Har101 l 1033 ].

Mainprovisions of France’s antiterrorism legislation

The1986 legislation has four main provisions. Firstly, there ought to bea particular infraction: “reprobates’ connotation with anextremist enterprise.” Persons with different levels of connectionin a course leading to extremism can be consequently detained andprosecuted. Additionally, it is not necessarily important to wait foran act to be executed. Other specific penalties have been added since2006. The second provision entailed judges dedicated to the cases. Atboth judicial inquiries and public prosecutor levels, special judgeswere utilized. At the administrative inquiry level, the number ofjudges augmented to seven. Special judges were also more involved inthe trial phases. The third provision ensured suspects could be heldfor up to 96 hours. The hours were increased to 144 by 2006.Enlargement of this period allows for verifications such as theinternet, telephone use, and seized documents among others tooptimize hearings. The fourth provision entailed jurisdiction for theFrench judicial individuals concerning the extremist acts involvingFrench nationals [ CITATION Har101 l 1033 ].

Thelegislation impacts have been quite helpful since the year 2000. Thisis because the system has allowed DST to avert numerous organizationsplanning to conduct attacks in France. In the same respect, over 800people have been apprehended. Similarly, the French arsenal of legaltools has enabled the country to counter any petitions for violence.Preachers, as well as imams, have also been expelled since theinception of this laws. Therefore, the legislation has proven to beeffective since the year 2000, and many culprits have apprehended.However, it does not mean the country is entirely safe since itcontinuously encounters challenges. Additionally, there is need toadopt the measures or rather the new laws with moderation [ CITATION Har101 l 1033 ].

References

Harmon, C. C. (2010). Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism. In C. C. Harmon, Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism (p. 355). McGraw-Hill Higher Education.